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Abstract
Modified numerals, such as at least three or more than five, are known to sometimes
give rise to ignorance inferences, in that their use suggests that the speaker does
not have exact knowledge. However, there have been disagreements regarding the
nature of these inferences, their robustness and context dependency, and differences
between at least and more than. We first present a series of experiments which sheds
new light on these issues and explains some contradicting reports in the previous
literature. Our results show that (a) the ignorance inferences of at least tend to be
more robust than those of more than, but (b) both modifiers are sensitive to the
question under discussion (QUD). We argue that this pattern can be explained if
we assume two sources of ignorance: traditional Quantity implicatures, which arise
regardless of the modifier but are sensitive to the QUD, and implicatures arising from
the maxim of inquisitive sincerity, which are QUD-insensitive but only appear with
at least.
1 Introduction
Modified numerals like at least n and more than n contrast in interesting ways with each
other and with bare numerals in the implicatures that they give rise to. The basic empirical
picture assumed in most work on the topic is as follows:
(1) a. The house has three bedrooms. ; exactly three 6; ignorance
b. The house has at least three bedrooms. 6; exactly three ; ignorance
c. The house has more than two bedrooms. 6; exactly three 6; ignorance
At least three and more than two do not trigger an upper-bounding implicature, in
the sense that they do not give rise to the inference that the house has exactly three
bedrooms, in contrast with the bare numeral three. Moreover, it is usually assumed that
at least triggers an ignorance implicature, unlike more than or bare numerals.
While the contrast in upper-bounding implicatures is uncontroversial, the ignorance
implicatures triggered by modified numerals are subject to ongoing debate. Do superlative
modifiers always convey ignorance? Do comparative modifiers never do so? And, moving
from empirical issues to theoretical ones, how do these ignorance implicatures come about?
What are the crucial pragmatic reasoning processes involved, and what are the basic se-
mantic structures associated with superlative and comparative modifiers that feed these
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processes? In order to delineate the contribution of the present paper, let us look at each
of these issues in some more detail.
The empirical issue: which modifiers convey ignorance, and when?
Consider the following scenario. The emergency department of a certain hospital is required
to have three physicians present at all times. Following a complaint by a patient who had
to wait for several hours on Tuesday last week, police officers are investigating whether the
requirement was satisfied. An employee of the hospital tells the officers:
(2) a. There were at least three physicians last Tuesday.
b. There were more than two physicians last Tuesday.
Can the officers conclude that the employee doesn’t know exactly how many physicians
there were? The received view is that the superlative modifier at least in (2a) does imply
such ignorance, while the comparative modifier more than in (2b) doesn’t (see, e.g., Geurts
and Nouwen, 2007; Bu¨ring, 2008; Cummins and Katsos, 2010; Nouwen, 2010; Kennedy,
2015). This assumption, however, is not universally shared. For instance, Westera and
Brasoveanu (2014) (henceforth W&B) hold that both at least and more than can in princi-
ple generate ignorance implicatures; whether they do is determined by the question under
discussion (QUD). More specifically, W&B propose that in response to a how many ques-
tion like (3a), both at least and more than imply ignorance, while in response to a polar
question like (3b), neither does.
(3) a. How many physicians were there last Tuesday? ; ignorance
b. Were there enough physicians last Tuesday? 6; ignorance
Mayr and Meyer (2014) (henceforth M&M) also propose that ignorance implicatures are
sensitive to the QUD. However, the specific empirical generalization that they suggest is
different from that of W&B. According to them, both types of modified numerals convey
ignorance in response to how many questions such as (3a), while only at least conveys
ignorance in response to polar questions such as (3b).
A third account where ignorance implicatures are sensitive to the QUD has been pro-
posed by Coppock and Brochhagen (2013b) (henceforth C&B). However, the specific pre-
dictions of this account again differ from those of W&B and those of M&M. Namely, on
the account of C&B neither at least nor more than conveys ignorance in response to polar
questions, while only at least conveys ignorance in response to how many questions. Note
that this is in a sense the reverse image of M&M’s view: QUD sensitivity is not assumed
for more than but rather for at least.
The different views are summarized in Table 1. The fact that different authors have
disagreed on some of the basic data shows the need for further experimental investigation.
The present paper offers experimental data lending support to some of W&B’s, M&M’s,
and C&B’s qualms with the standard empirical picture, but we also identify new con-
trasts. In particular, we find a three-way contrast in strength/robustness of the ignorance
implicatures triggered by modified numerals:
1. The ignorance implicatures of at least in how many contexts are strong and robust:
they are observed across different experimental settings.
2. The ignorance implicatures of (a) at least in polar contexts and (b) more than in how
many contexts are less robust: they are not detected in all experimental settings.
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Modifier QUD Received view W&B M&M C&B
How many Yes Yes Yes
At least
Polar
Yes
No Yes No
How many Yes Yes No
More than
Polar
No
No No No
Table 1: Empirical views on the ignorance implications of modified numerals.
Moreover, the experimental settings in which the former are detected are not the
same as those in which the latter are detected. Finally, ignorance inferences are
usually weaker in these cases (and certainly never stronger) than those of at least in
how many contexts.
3. We did not find any evidence for ignorance implicatures with more than in polar
contexts, suggesting that if there are any they must be very weak.
This three-way contrast has not previously been identified, and forms a challenge for pre-
vious accounts, as will be discussed below.
The theoretical issue: how do ignorance inferences arise?
There is a wide consensus in the literature that the ignorance conveyed by modified nu-
merals is not directly encoded in their lexical semantics, but rather derived pragmatically
(pace Geurts and Nouwen, 2007). The precise nature of the pragmatic reasoning that leads
to these ignorance inferences, however, is a matter of ongoing debate.
One approach is to derive ignorance inferences from Grice’s maxim of quantity (Schwarz,
2013, 2016b; Mayr and Meyer, 2014; Westera and Brasoveanu, 2014; Kennedy, 2015, among
others). On this approach, one way to account for differences between the various kinds
of modified numerals is to assume that they have different formal pragmatic alternatives,
which, depending on the QUD, may or may not play an active role in the derivation of
quantity implicatures.
Another approach is to derive ignorance inferences from the maxim of inquisitive
sincerity, which is not concerned with the informative content of the uttered sentence,
but rather with its inquisitive content, i.e., the semantic alternatives that it introduces
(Coppock and Brochhagen, 2013b). Differences between the various kinds of modified
numerals are accounted for on this approach by assuming that they introduce different
semantic alternatives.
The present paper argues for a dual route hypothesis: both Gricean quantity and in-
quisitive sincerity potentially play a role in the derivation of ignorance inferences. However,
whether these maxims come into play depends on the construction and context at hand.
In particular, Gricean quantity gives rise to ignorance inferences when formal alternatives
are activated, which we will argue is the case in typical how many contexts but not in polar
contexts, while inquisitive sincerity gives rise to ignorance inferences whenever semantic
alternatives are activated, which we propose to be the case with at least but not with
more than. Consequently, as depicted in Table 2, ignorance inferences triggered by at least
in how many contexts are expected to be strong and robust across different experimental
settings, while those triggered by at least in polar contexts or by more than in how many
contexts are expected to be weaker and less robust, because they rely either on inquisitive
sincerity or on Gricean quantity alone. Moreover, since the ignorance inferences triggered
by at least in polar contexts and those triggered by more than in how many contexts are
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Modifier QUD Source Strength/robustness
How many Both sincerity and quantity Strong
At least
Polar Only sincerity Intermediate
How many Only quantity Intermediate
More than
Polar None Null
Table 2: Source and strength/robustness of ignorance on the dual route hypothesis.
of a different nature under the present hypothesis, it is expected that they may differ from
each other both in strength and in the kinds of experimental settings in which they are
detectable. Finally, no ignorance inferences are expected to arise with more than in polar
contexts, since neither inquisitive sincerity nor Gricean quantity is effective in this case.
Thus, we argue that the two most prominent approaches to explaining the ignorance
inferences of modified numerals—one relying on Gricean quantity and the other on inquis-
itive sincerity—should not be regarded as being in competition, but rather complement
each other and are both needed to capture the subtle empirical contrasts observed.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, Section 2 provides more detailed dis-
cussion of quantity-based approaches, and Section 3 reviews the inquisitive sincerity-based
approach. Against this background, our experimental work is presented in Section 4,
our dual route account is developed in Section 5, and the predictions of this account are
discussed in detail in Section 6, with particular reference to the experimental findings
presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Approaches based on Gricean quantity
2.1 Schwarz
We will first review the quantity-based account of Schwarz (2013, 2016b).1 This account
is only concerned with at least, leaving more than out of consideration.2 In Section 2.2 we
will turn to the proposal of Mayr and Meyer (2014), which can be seen as an extension of
Schwarz’s account to cover both at least and more than.
Semantically, Schwarz assumes that a sentence like (4) simply expresses the proposition
consisting of all possible worlds where Sam hired two or more cooks.
(4) Sam hired at least two cooks.
Further, Schwarz assumes that the formal alternatives for a sentence like (4) are determined
by two interacting Horn scales: one involving numerals, 〈1, 2, 3, ...〉, and the other involving
the modifier at least, which according to Schwarz forms a Horn scale with only. Thus for
any natural number n, both ‘Sam hired only n cooks’ and ‘Sam hired at least n cooks’
1We will reformulate the account somewhat, in a way that will allow for easy comparison with our own
proposal. The essence of the account, as well as its empirical predictions, will of course be maintained.
2See Mayr (2013), Kennedy (2015), and Alrenga (2016) for closely related quantity-based proposals.
The latter focuses just on at least, like Schwarz, but the former two explicitly treat more than as well.
Kennedy (2015) predicts that more than does not yield ignorance implicatures, while at least does. Mayr
(2013) is mainly concerned with upper-bounding implicatures and does not explicitly discuss the predictions
of his analysis concerning ignorance implicatures; as far as we can tell, however, neither at least nor more
than is predicted to trigger any ignorance implicatures on this account.
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are formal alternatives for (4). Schwarz uses the following notation to compactly list these
alternatives.
(5) Formal alternatives for (4):
[1] [1 2 3 4 ... )
[2] [2 3 4 ... )
[3] [3 4 ... )
[4] [4 ... )
... ...
To articulate how Schwarz takes these formal alternatives to factor into pragmatic reason-
ing, we introduce the following background notions and notation. A speaker’s information
state is modeled as a non-empty set of worlds. We say that an information state s sup-
ports a sentence ϕ iff s ⊆ [[ϕ]]. On the other hand, we say that s rejects a sentence ϕ iff
s∩ [[ϕ]] = ∅. Finally, we use Aϕ to denote the set of lexically determined formal alternatives
for ϕ.
Implicatures can be seen as imposing constraints on what the speaker’s information
state might be. On Schwarz’s approach, they are derived using the following recipe. First,
the quality implicature that the speaker’s information state s supports ϕ is derived:
(6) quality(ϕ) := {s | s supports ϕ}
Then primary quantity implicatures are derived based on the assumption that the
speaker’s state does not support any formal alternative ψ ∈ Aϕ that is stronger than ϕ
itself. We use A⊂ϕ to denote the set of those stronger alternatives:
(7) A⊂ϕ := {ψ ∈ Aϕ | [[ψ]] ⊂ [[ϕ]]}
(8) quantity1(ϕ) := {s | s does not support any ψ ∈ A⊂ϕ}
Finally, secondary quantity implicatures are derived by identifying all alternatives
ψ ∈ A⊂ϕ that are innocently excludable w.r.t. ϕ (Gazdar, 1979; Fox, 2007). Informally
speaking, ψ is innocently excludable if, whenever a set of alternatives in A⊂ϕ has been
consistently rejected we can always go on to reject ψ in addition, maintaining consistency.
More precisely: for every subset A′ of A⊂ϕ , if it is possible to find an information state in
quality(ϕ)∩ quantity1(ϕ) that rejects every sentence in A′, then it is also possible to find a
state in quality(ϕ) ∩ quantity1(ϕ) that rejects every sentence in A′ as well as ψ.
Secondary quantity implicatures are based on the assumption that the speaker’s infor-
mation state rejects all innocently excludable alternatives in A⊂ϕ .
(9) quantity2(ϕ) := {s | s rejects every ψ ∈ A⊂ϕ that is innocently excludable w.r.t. ϕ}
If a speaker with information state s utters a sentence ϕ in a cooperative conversation, it
is assumed that s ∈ quality(ϕ) ∩ quantity1(ϕ) ∩ quantity2(ϕ).
None of the formal alternatives that Schwarz assumes for example (4) is innocently
excludable. For instance, the assumption that the speaker’s information state s rejects [2]
is incompatible with the assumption that it rejects [3,...), given the quality implicature that
s supports [2,...). So we get primary quantity implicatures, but no secondary ones. The
primary quantity implicatures say that the speaker’s information state does not reject any
of the formal alternatives that are stronger than [2,...). Thus, ignorance is derived. On the
other hand, it is predicted that the sentence does not have an upper-bounding implicature,
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which in the case of bare numerals comes about as a secondary quantity implicature.
2.2 Mayr and Meyer
Mayr and Meyer (2014) (M&M) present a theory that is much in the same spirit as that of
Schwarz (2016b), but covers comparative modifiers as well. More specifically, it is designed
to account for the following empirical generalizations:
• Superlative modifiers never give rise to upper-bounding implicatures, but always
yield ignorance implicatures;
• Comparative modifiers never give rise to upper-bounding implicatures, but some-
times do yield ignorance implicatures, depending on the question under discussion.
The first generalization is standard. The second generalization, however, diverges from
what is typically assumed. To motivate it, M&M submit that more than and at least
equally convey ignorance on the part of the speaker in the following pair of examples:
(10) a. Q: What’s the distance between Ramallah and Jerusalem?
A: It’s more than 10km. ; ignorance
b. Q: What’s the distance between Ramallah and Jerusalem?
A: It’s at least 10km. ; ignorance
Moreover, to justify the claim that the question under discussion affects whether more than
conveys ignorance, M&M submit that there is a contrast between (11a), which involves a
how many question, and (11b), which involves a polar question.
(11) a. Q: How many kids do you have?
A: #I have more than three kids. ; ignorance
b. Q: I need to double-check if you qualify for these benefits. You have three
kids?
A: I have more than three kids. 6; ignorance
Observe that a version of (11b) with at least in place of more than, given in (12b), is quite
odd, in line with the assumption that at least always gives rise to ignorance implicatures,
even in cases where more than does not.
(12) a. Q: How many kids do you have?
A: #I have at least three kids. ; ignorance
b. Q: I need to double-check if you qualify for these benefits. You have three
kids?
A: #I have at least three kids. ; ignorance
M&M’s theory differs from Schwarz’s in a number of respects of varying importance for the
issue at hand. One difference is that they assume that the LF of a sentence may or may
not include an exhaustivity operator EXH (following, e.g., Chierchia et al., 2012). This
operator has the effect of negating any stronger formal alternatives that are innocently
excludable. M&M assume a pragmatic principle requiring, roughly, that an interpretation
involving EXH is to be preferred whenever it is stronger than the one without EXH, and
relevant with respect to the question under discussion. This assumption obviates the
need to compute secondary quantity implicatures, so that part of the account of Schwarz
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presented above is not included in their theory. Primary quantity implicatures are derived
in a similar way, however: if a speaker utters a sentence ϕ, then for every formal alternative
ψ of ϕ that is relevant w.r.t. the question under discussion and stronger than ϕ, it is inferred
that the speaker’s information state does not support ψ.
A second difference between M&M’s theory and Schwarz’s is that M&M make use of a
general recipe for computing formal alternatives, adopted from Katzir (2007) and Fox and
Katzir (2011), rather than stipulating them as Schwarz does. For at least, this recipe yields
essentially the same result as Schwarz’s stipulations: the pertinent formal alternatives to at
least three, for example, are of the form at least n and n (the latter of which are understood
under an ‘exactly’ interpretation). For more than three, the pertinent alternatives are of
the form more than n and n.
Thirdly, and most importantly, M&M allow for the ‘pruning’ of formal alternatives,
subject to a certain constraint (following Fox and Katzir, 2011). According to M&M, this
constraint prevents the pruning of alternatives for at least under any circumstance, and
because the alternatives are still in place, ignorance implicatures are always generated just
as under Schwarz’s theory. But with more than, the alternatives can be pruned. The
constraint is as follows:
(13) Constraint on Alternative Pruning (M&M slide 29, Fox and Katzir, 2011)
Given a structure ϕ, the set ALT(ϕ) can be pruned to a subset A ⊆ ALT(ϕ) only
if there is no distinct alternative ψ ∈ ALT(ϕ) such that [[ EXH A ϕ]] = [[ψ]]
For example, for (11b), M&M consider the pruned set of alternatives A={three, more than
three}. If the sentence is exhaustified with respect to this set of alternatives A, the result
is not equivalent to any of the original formal alternatives. More specifically, since neither
of the alternatives in A is stronger than the uttered sentence itself, exhaustification has
no effect at all. Hence the constraint on alternative pruning is satisfied. Thus, given that
primary quantity implicatures are now computed based on the pruned set of alternatives A,
no ignorance implicature is predicted to arise.
M&M also consider the case of (12b) and the potential pruning A={three, at least
three}. Exhaustifying with respect to this pruned set of alternatives A would yield a
meaning equivalent to at least four, which is one of the original alternatives. This is because
three is a stronger and innocently excludable alternative that can therefore be targeted by
EXH. Because this pruning violates the condition on alternative pruning, the alternatives
stay as they are, giving rise to the ignorance implicature, just as under Schwarz’s account.
One question that is left open in M&M’s proposal is which potential prunings should
be considered exactly. Example (12b), where the considered pruned set of alternatives is
{three, at least three}, suggests that it is not just alternatives that are strictly relevant to
the QUD that may remain after pruning. Depending on how the QUD is interpreted in the
given example, either three or at least three is not directly relevant to it. This raises the
question what would happen if the pruned set were just, say, {five}. The single alternative
five would be innocently excludable, and the resulting meaning, with a ‘gap’ for five as it
were, would not be equivalent to any of the original alternatives. Thus it seems that this
should be a licit pruning, yielding a very strange interpretation. Presumably the account
should be amended so that the pruned sets consist only of QUD-relevant alternatives. As
far as we can see, this would deliver the desired prediction for example (12b).
However, the following variant of (12b), which is actually more semantically parallel
to (11b), appears to be a cause for concern:
(14) Q: I need to double-check if you qualify for these benefits. You have three kids?
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Figure 1: Westera and Brasoveanu’s (2014) experimental design.
A: I have at least four kids.
If {three, at least four} is a licit pruning here, parallel to the case with more than, then
ignorance implicatures are predicted to disappear in this case, contrary to M&M’s empirical
claim that at least always yields ignorance implicatures, and in conflict with the intuition
that the answer in (14) conveys just as much ignorance, and is therefore just as odd, as
the answer in M&M’s example (12b).
We leave open whether this challenge can be addressed. It may be possible to derive
the predictions that Mayr and Meyer (2014) intend to make within the confines of a
quantity-based approach. We note, however, that the strategy of deriving both scalar and
ignorance implicatures from exhaustivity-based reasoning about formal alternatives entails
a very tight coupling between ignorance implicatures and upper-bounding implicatures.
We suspect that this bond may be difficult to break, something that would be needed in
order to account for the claimed difference in ignorance implicatures between at least and
more than in the context of a polar QUD.
2.3 Westera and Brasoveanu
Westera and Brasoveanu (2014) (W&B), independently of M&M, also argue that the stan-
dard empirical assumptions about the ignorance inferences triggered by at least and more
than are too simplistic. However, the empirical generalizations that they propose, driven
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Figure 2: Westera and Brasoveanu’s (2014) results.
by experimental data, are different from those of M&M.
As depicted in Figure 1, W&B presented experimental participants with courtroom
dialogues such as the one in (15):
(15) Judge: What did you see under the bed?
Witness: I saw at most 10 diamonds under the bed.
The type of question was experimentally manipulated as indicated in Figure 1, and the
witness’s response always contained either a superlative modified numeral, at most 10, or
a comparative modified numeral, less than 10. Participants were then told that the judge
concluded that the witness does not know exactly how many diamonds she saw under the
bed, and were asked how justified the judge was in drawing that conclusion, on a 1–5 scale.
From the results, given in Figure 2, W&B conclude that, contra the received view but
in line with M&M, comparative modifiers sometimes do signal ignorance (e.g. in response
to how many exactly questions), and also, contra the received view as well as M&M, that
superlative modifiers sometimes don’t convey ignorance (most clearly in polar contexts).
Extrapolating from these observations, W&B propose the following:
• When sentences with modified numerals are considered in the context of a fully
explicit QUD, ignorance inferences are triggered if and only if the QUD requires an
exact answer (e.g., in how many exactly context but not in how many approximately
or polar contexts). This holds for superlative and comparative modified numerals
alike, and is a result of straightforward quantity-based pragmatic reasoning: the
speaker did not provide an exact answer, so, assuming that she intends to comply
with the maxim of quantity, she must be unable to give an exact answer, i.e., she
must be (partially) ignorant.
• If there is no explicit QUD, or if the QUD does not fully determine whether an exact
answer is required or not (W&B assume that this is the case, for instance, for how
many questions), the strength of the ignorance inference that arises depends on how
likely it is that an exact answer is required in the context at hand. According to
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W&B, this likelihood is higher with superlative modified numerals than with com-
parative ones, since the former are more often used in contexts where exact numerical
information is required than the latter (they provide partial support for the latter
claim based on a corpus-based study). Thus, it is predicted that in underspecified or
‘out of the blue’ contexts, at least triggers stronger ignorance inferences than more
than.
We will make four brief remarks about W&B’s design, empirical results, and theoretical
proposals at this point—a more in-depth discussion will be provided once our own ex-
perimental data have been presented. First, among the six types of context that W&B
considered, a significant difference between superlative and comparative modifiers was only
found in how many contexts. The fact that superlative and comparative modifiers generally
behaved alike is in line with W&B’s view that, whenever the QUD is fully specified, there
should be no difference between the two types of modifier. By contrast, it is surprising on
the received view, on which superlative modifiers convey ignorance and comparative ones
do not. This said, note that the fact that no significant difference was found between the
two types of modifier (in most contexts) is a null result, and may be due in part to the
experimental setting. That is, it may well be that in other experimental settings, differ-
ences between superlative and comparative modifiers can more easily be detected. This
will indeed be the case in some of the experiments presented below.
Second, W&B’s explanation for the difference between superlative and comparative
modifiers in how many contexts does not seem quite satisfactory, since it relies on the
assumption that it is not clear in such contexts whether an exact answer is required. This
assumption seems implausible: if a witness appears in front of a judge and is asked how
many diamonds she saw under the bed, then she is clearly expected to say exactly how
many diamonds she saw. An approximate answer is only in order if she cannot give an
exact one. Thus, an alternative explanation of the observed contrast, one that does not
rely on the assumption that it is unclear whether an exact answer is expected in how many
contexts, would be preferable in our view.
Third, contrasts like those in (16) seem difficult to explain on the proposed account:
(16) a. I grew up with more than two parents.
b. ??I grew up with at least three parents.
Intuitively, (16b) seems odd to us because it has the unlikely implication that the speaker
does not remember with how many parents she grew up. On the other hand, (16a) does
not seem to force this ignorance implication and is therefore not odd. On W&B’s account,
if these sentences are considered out of the blue, an ignorance implicature arises only if
the interpreter considers it likely that they were uttered in a context in which a precise
answer was required. In this specific case, however, the fact that it is unlikely that the
speaker does not remember with how many parents she grew up should make it unlikely
for the interpreter that the sentence was uttered in a context in which such an ignorance
implicature would have arisen. So the most plausible assumption to make is that the
context of utterance did not require an exact answer. But this makes it impossible to
explain the oddness of (16b). More generally, we suspect that the ignorance implicature of
at least is more robust than predicted by W&B’s theory.
Finally, it should be noted that the polar contexts that W&B considered are quite
special, because they involve responses that completely ‘echo’ the question, as exemplified
in (17).
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(17) A: Did you find at most 10 of the diamonds under the bed?
B: I found at most 10 of the diamonds under the bed.
This ‘echoing’ may have certain idiosyncratic effects. In order to draw general conclusions
about the behaviour of superlative and comparative modifiers in polar contexts it would be
preferable to avoid such effects. This may be done by considering dialogues such as (18).
(18) Context: Bill’s diet prescribes that he eat at most three apples per day.
A: Did Bill stick to his diet today?
B: No, he ate more than three apples.
B′: No, he ate at least four apples.
W&B predict that in such dialogues there is no contrast between superlative and compara-
tive modifiers: neither is expected to convey ignorance. M&M, on the other hand, predict
that at least does convey ignorance in this case, while more than does not, in line with the
received view. This, then, is a crucial case to test in order to assess W&B’s proposal.
3 An approach based on inquisitive sincerity
Bu¨ring (2008) expressed the intuition that at least n amounts to a disjunction of the form
n or more at some level of analysis. Coppock and Brochhagen (2013b) (C&B) propose
that the relevant level of analysis is semantic (rather than syntactic or pragmatic) and
show that such an account can be formulated in inquisitive semantics (Ciardelli et al.,
2013). In this framework, every sentence generates a set of semantic alternatives, where
each semantic alternative is a set of possible worlds. If a sentence generates two or more
alternatives, it is thought of as expressing an issue as to which of these alternatives holds.
In this case the sentence is called inquisitive. For instance, a disjunctive clause ‘ϕ or ψ’
typically generates a set containing multiple alternatives, namely those associated with ϕ
as well as those associated with ψ, and expresses the issue as to which of these holds.
According to C&B, the commonality between disjunctions and at least sentences is that
both generate multiple semantic alternatives and therefore express non-trivial issues.
More precisely, C&B propose that the set of alternatives generated by an at least
sentence consists of all answers to the QUD that are at least as strong as one of the
alternatives generated by the prejacent. To illustrate this, first consider the QUD in (19).
(19) How many apples did Bill eat?
Suppose that the answers to this QUD are [0], [1], [2], etcetera. Then we get that:
(20) [[Bill ate at least four apples ]] = {[4], [5], [6], . . . }
As for more than sentences, C&B assume that they always generate a single alternative,
which is the union of the answers to the QUD that are at least as strong as one of the
alternatives generated by the prejacent. Thus, in the context of the QUD in (19), we get
that:
(21) [[Bill ate more than three apples ]] = {[4,...)}
Turning now from semantics to pragmatics, Coppock and Brochhagen do not only assume
the standard Gricean maxims, but also an inquisitive sincerity maxim, which can be char-
acterized informally as: ‘Don’t utter an inquisitive sentence if you already know how to
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resolve the issue that it expresses’ (Groenendijk and Roelofsen, 2009). More formally, if a
sentence generates multiple alternatives, then the speaker’s information state should not be
contained in any of these alternatives. This sincerity maxim, together with the semantics
in (20), derives ignorance implicatures for at least sentences in the context of how many
questions.
C&B do not explicitly discuss cases where the QUD is a polar question, but it is clear
what their account predicts in such cases. Consider the context in (18), repeated in (22).
(22) Context: Bill’s diet prescribes that he eat at most three apples per day.
QUD: Did Bill stick to his diet today?
Assume that the answers to the QUD are [0,...,3] and [4,...). Then we get that:
(23) [[Bill ate at least four apples ]] = {[4,...)}
(24) [[Bill ate more than three apples ]] = {[4,...)}
That is, both at least and more than just generate a single alternative in this case. Igno-
rance implicatures are therefore not predicted to arise, at least not through the inquisitive
sincerity maxim. C&B do not explicitly discuss whether ignorance implicatures may arise
through Gricean quantity-based reasoning. But as far as inquisitive sincerity-based igno-
rance implicatures are concerned, they predict that more than has none, and that at least
has them in how many contexts but not polar contexts.
This concludes our discussion of some of the existing approaches to superlative and
comparative modified numerals. As anticipated in the introduction, we have seen that
these approaches differ both in empirical predictions and in what they take to be the
fundamental source of ignorance implicatures triggered by modified numerals. In the next
section, we provide novel data from a series of experiments, aiming to establish a more
solid empirical basis for evaluating these approaches and further developing them.
4 Experimental data
4.1 Experiment 1
4.1.1 Goals
The goal of our first experiment was to establish some basic facts regarding ignorance
implicatures triggered by more than and at least in the context of two types of QUD:
how many questions and polar questions. In particular, we wanted to see whether the
patterns found by Westera and Brasoveanu (2014), reviewed above, could be replicated
using a different experimental setup, one that is closer to the truth-value judgment task
standardly used in the experimental literature on implicatures.
Participants had to judge the acceptability of statements made during a card game.
This setup made it very easy to construct complete information and ignorance scenarios.
In the former kind of scenario, a player makes a statement about her cards at a point in
the game where she knows what all her cards are. In the latter, she makes a statement
about her cards at a point where she has not seen all her cards yet. Both scenarios can be
represented visually, by means of a simple picture (see Figure 3 for an example).
In this setup, we can test the presence of ignorance inferences by studying how people
judge interpretations that violate such inferences. This is a common strategy in other
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Figure 3: Example of a target item in Exp. 1
pragmatic studies, for example, on scalar implicatures (Bott and Noveck, 2004). The
specific design that we used has been employed successfully in a study of primary scalar
implicatures in Dieuleveut et al. (2017).
Given that the scenario is made very explicit, it is possible to ensure that polar questions
and how many questions have exactly the properties that we want them to have. In
particular, we can specify details of the scenario in such a way that it is extremely unlikely
that how many questions would be treated underlyingly as polar questions.
We can also avoid echoic responses to polar questions that W&B used, capitalizing on
the fact that I have at least six clubs entails a ‘yes’ answer to the question Will you win
this round? (see below for details). This is desirable because echoic responses may lack
the semantic alternatives that they would normally have.
Finally, our setup allows us to test differences between answers which exactly match
the ‘yes’ answer to a polar question and answers which provide more information than
necessary.
4.1.2 Methodology
Participants: 50 participants were recruited on MTurk for the experiment. The partic-
ipants were self-reported adult English speakers (age: 18 – 67, mean: 35). They received
$2.50 for their participation in the experiment.
Materials and procedure: The task of every participant was to judge the appropriate-
ness of statements on a 5-point scale (1 signalled the lowest level of appropriateness, and
5 signalled the highest level). Statements were presented as answers to questions and were
accompanied by a pictorial situation. An example of an item is given in Figure 3.
The following background story preceded the actual experiment:
Mary is playing a card game online. Each round consists of a betting phase
and a playing phase.
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Betting phase: At the beginning of the betting phase, each player receives
8 cards: 6 visible (to them) and 2 face down. Players look at their first six
cards. Based on what they see, all players place a bet on their chance to win
the round. Then the players see their seventh card and place a second bet. A
final bet is placed after players see their eighth and last card. When all players
have placed their last bets, the playing phase begins.
Playing phase: The exact rules for this part of the game are not relevant here.
Clubs are the trump suit (a club card beats any card from other suits), and if
Mary receives six or more clubs, she is bound to win (she has an unbeatable
strategy).
Scoring: If Mary wins the round, she earns the number of points she bet, plus
one bonus point for each face card she had (Jack, Queen or King). Face cards
only influence scoring and do not play any special role in the playing phase.
Sue is Mary’s best friend. She knows the rules of the game and Mary’s strategy,
but is not currently playing. Sue walks into the room at some point during the
betting phase and asks Mary a question. Sue cannot see Mary’s screen, so she
doesn’t know which cards Mary got or whether Mary has seen all of her cards
yet when she asks her question. Mary has no reason to hide information from
Sue.
Each stimulus consisted of the picture of 8 cards, showing Mary’s cards. Sue’s question
and Mary’s answer were below the picture (see Fig. 3).
The experiment consisted of 108 experimental stimuli and 51 fillers. The experimental
stimuli tested 3 quantifiers (Condition: Quantifier), 3 QUD-Answer relations (Condi-
tion: QUD) and 4 situations (Condition: Situation). Each combination of conditions
was repeated three times.
The following three quantifiers were used for the Quantifier condition: at least n,
more than n, and the bare numeral n. For example, for the situation depicted in Fig. 3,
these three versions were used:
(25) a. At least three of my eight cards are clubs.
b. More than two of my eight cards are clubs.
c. Three of my eight cards are clubs.
The QUD manipulation consisted of 3 conditions. In the first (How many), Sue asked a
how many question about the number of face cards (see Fig. 3). The other two conditions
involved polar questions, and differed with respect to whether the answer was directly
relevant to the question. In the PolarRelevant condition, Sue asked a polar question
(Will you win this round? ) and Mary responded using the relevant information to de-
termine winning (e.g., Yes, at least six/more than five of my eight cards are clubs).3 In
the PolarOverInf condition, Sue asked the same polar question and Mary responded
providing more information than necessary (e.g., Yes, at least seven/more than six of my
eight cards are clubs).
The Situation manipulation consisted of 4 conditions. In the first case (False), all
the cards were revealed and Mary’s answer was simply false: there were always 2 clubs/face
cards less than what she reported. In the second case (Ignorance), Mary’s answer was
given during the uncovering phase (one or two cards were still covered). The cards revealed
3Recall that in order to be sure she will win, Mary had to have 6 or more clubs.
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so far supported the lower bound of her response. In the third case (Exceed), all the cards
were revealed and there was one more club/face card than the lower bound conveyed by
Mary’s answer. In the last condition (Exact), all the cards were revealed and the number
of club/face cards was exactly the lower bound conveyed by the answer.
The actual experiment was preceded by 6 practice trials. The practice trials were similar
to the experimental stimuli in their design, but unlike experimental items they indicated
whether Mary’s answer was appropriate or not and why this was so. None of the practice
trials used any construction that was tested in the experiment (at least or more than).
Pre-processing and data analysis: We first removed the fastest and slowest 1% of
responses as outliers. We then calculated individual error rates on control items for which
we expected a clear answer. In such cases, ‘3’ never counted as a correct answer (hence the
theoretical chance level is at 40%). Four participants were removed because their error rate
on control items was at least one standard deviation above the mean error rate (threshold:
22.7%). The mean error rate on remaining participants was 7.6%.
For statistical analysis, responses were treated as a continuous variable and normalized
by participant. We fitted mixed-effects linear models with the lme4 package in R (R Core
Team, 2014; Bates et al., 2014), following the recommendations of Bates et al. (2015)
regarding the specification of the random effects structure. For the calculation of p-values,
we approximated the t-distribution with a Gaussian curve. (This approximation should
not be problematic given the number of participants.)
4.1.3 Results
The detailed results on target conditions are presented in Figure 4. In the rest of this
section and for the statistical analyses, we leave aside the False situations, which gave
rise to very low ratings in all conditions, as expected.
We fitted a linear mixed-effects model on responses to the Exact, Exceed and Igno-
rance conditions for sentences with at least and more than, in response to how many and
polar questions. All three factors (Quantifier, QUD, and Situation) were treatment-
coded, with Ignorance as the Situation baseline, more than as the Quantifier base-
line, and how many as the QUD baseline. The results are given in Table 3.
The middle column in Figure 4 shows that, across all QUD conditions (corresponding
to the rows), ratings for more than sentences in the Exact, Exceed, and Ignorance
situations are all roughly on a par with each other. Thus more than does not appear to
exhibit a preference for ignorance situations. This conclusion is supported by our statistical
analysis shown in Table 3. With more than sentences, across all QUD conditions, the
differences between the baseline Ignorance condition and the non-Ignorance conditions
are non-significant (with one possible exception: for sentences giving a relevant answer to a
polar QUD, the ratings were 0.41 scale points higher on average in the Exceed situation,
compared to the Ignorance situation, and this difference is significant, though only at
the 0.05 level, which is arguably too lax given the number of comparisons we are testing).
Things were different in the case of at least, as seen in the leftmost column in Figure
4, showing that ratings for at least sentences in non-Ignorance situations were generally
lower than in Ignorance situations. This is supported by the statistical analysis. Across
all QUD types, the ratings for sentences in the Exact condition were significantly lower
compared to the Ignorance baseline (between 0.82 and 1.13 scale points lower on aver-
age). The finding supports previous claims that precise knowledge negatively affects the
acceptability of at least more than the acceptability of more than.
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Figure 4: Individual responses to each target condition in Experiment 1.
The relative acceptability of at least in the Exceed situation, compared to the Ig-
norance situation, depended on the nature of the QUD. Ratings for at least sentences
were significantly lower in the Exceed situation in the context of a how many question
(0.66 scale points lower on average), but not in the context of a polar question (0.29 or
0.32 scale points lower on average, depending on whether the answer was relevant). Hence,
broadly speaking, the deviance due to ignorance inferences of at least is not as strong in
the context of polar questions.
As a post-hoc analysis, we fitted a model on the results of at least which pooled the Ex-
act and Exceed situations together as a new condition Precise. The PolarRelevant
and PolarOverInf conditions were also pooled together as a new condition, Polar. The
model did not explain significantly less variance than a full model (χ2(5) = 8.5, p = 0.13),
and it showed a strong negative effect of the Precise situation (t = −5.2, p < .001)
as well as a strong positive interaction of the Precise situation with the Polar QUD
(t = 4.9, p < .001).
We analyzed the results for bare numerals separately. Unsurprisingly, we observed that
the Exact condition was rated higher than the Ignorance condition (t = 5.2, p < .001),
which in turn was higher than the Exceed condition (t = 13, p < .001). The False
condition was still lower than the Exceed condition (t = 5.7, p < .001). Interestingly, the
Exceed and Ignorance conditions were both rated higher with Polar QUDs (t = 3.7
and t = 7.8, respectively, both p < .001), while the False and Exact conditions were
unaffected by the QUD type (both t < .4, p > .72).
4.1.4 Discussion
We saw no trace of ignorance inferences with more than, except for a small trend in
responses to how many questions (in the Exceed situation). By contrast, at least gave rise
to clear ignorance inferences, as evidenced by its lower acceptability in Exceed and Exact
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β t-value p-value
(Intercept) -0.05 -0.6 0.58
Situation[Exact] -0.07 -0.6 0.57
Situation[Exceed] -0.24 -1.8 0.073.
Quantifier[AL] 0.42 3.2 0.001??
QUD[PolarRelevant] -0.11 -0.8 0.44
QUD[PolarOverInf] 0.41 3.5 0.001??
Situation[Exact]:Quantifier[AL] -1.13 -5.5 0.000???
Situation[Exceed]:Quantifier[AL] -0.66 -3.8 0.000???
Situation[Exact]:QUD[PolarRelevant] -0.02 -0.1 0.93
Situation[Exceed]:QUD[PolarRelevant] 0.41 2.3 0.019?
Situation[Exact]:QUD[PolarOverInf] 0.06 0.4 0.69
Situation[Exceed]:QUD[PolarOverInf] 0.24 1.6 0.11
Quantifier[AL]:QUD[PolarRelevant] 0.10 0.6 0.54
Quantifier[AL]:QUD[PolarOverInf] -0.48 -3.1 0.002??
Situation[Exact]:Quantifier[AL]:QUD[PolarRelevant ] 0.90 3.8 0.000???
Situation[Exceed]:Quantifier[AL]:QUD[PolarRelevant ] 0.29 1.3 0.20
Situation[Exact]:Quantifier[AL]:QUD[PolarOverInf ] 0.82 3.5 0.000???
Situation[Exceed]:Quantifier[AL]:QUD[PolarOverInf ] 0.32 1.6 0.12
Table 3: Estimates for the fixed effects of the model fitted on target conditions for Exper-
iment 1. (AL = at least)
situations compared to the Ignorance situation, although the ignorance inferences were
found to be weaker in the context of a polar question. The present results are therefore at
odds with the results reported by W&B, who report similar ignorance inferences with at
least and more than.
Note that the absence of ignorance inferences with more than cannot be explained
by a lack of statistical power, as we were able to clearly detect QUD effects on at least.
If anything, the standard errors for our data seem to be overall smaller than W&B’s.
Our experimental design differed from theirs on a few key points, which could explain the
observed differences. First of all, our participants’ task was to evaluate the appropriateness
of an utterance given the knowledge state of a speaker, while W&B required participants
to judge an inference about a speaker’s knowledge state, given their utterance. In short,
we could say that our task was more “speaker oriented” (evaluating whether an utterance
is acceptable is similar to considering whether one could utter such an utterance) while
W&B’s task was more “hearer oriented”. Second, we situated our conversations in a
more casual set-up (a discussion between friends), while W&B used a very formal context
(a witness testifying in front of a judge). Third, we tested positive modified numerals
(at least and more than), whereas W&B tested their negative counterparts (at most and
less than). Coppock and Brochhagen (2013a) tested both positive and negative modified
numerals and found a difference between them: truth-value judgments for at most n were
strongly degraded for situations depicted with fewer than n objects, in contrast to fewer
than n + 1; at least n + 1 and more than n did not show such a strong contrast. If
anything, the difference between the results of our first experiment and W&B go in the
opposite direction. The influence of monotonicity is thus unclear.
At this point, it is unclear which of these factors may explain the discrepancies between
our results and those reported by W&B. In the next two experiments, we adopt a design
much closer to theirs, while avoiding the issues we identified in their experiments. To
foreshadow the results, the first factor (“speaker” vs. “hearer” orientation) seems to best
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explain the differences, but a contrast between positive and negative modified numerals
may have played a role as well.
Before turning to the next experiment, let us briefly discuss the results obtained with
bare numerals, even though this is not the main focus of the paper. In general, our findings
support the view that numerals start with a one-sided (at-least) denotation and receive
their exact reading through implicatures (Horn, 1972, see Spector, 2013 for a review). First,
we see that the Exceed condition (which involved a situation with more than n items)
is rated much higher than the False condition (which involved a situation with less than
n items), suggesting that bare numerals are more sensitive to violations in one direction
than in the other. Second, the fact that Exceed is less accepted than Ignorance (where
the exact reading is neither supported nor excluded) is indicative of a primary implicature,
as predicted by the traditional implicature approach. The fact that Ignorance is less
accepted than Exact could be indicative of either secondary implicatures or an ambiguity
between one-sided and two-sided readings. Third, we found that the contrasts between Ex-
ceed and Ignorance and between Ignorance and Exact were sensitive to the QUD.
This is at odds with the ambiguity approach of Geurts (2006) or Kennedy (2015), which
assumes that the ambiguity is always resolved in favor of the strongest reading (Strongest
Meaning Hypothesis). Overall, these results are surprising because in most experimental
settings, numerals diverge from archetypal scalar implicatures (see, e.g., Papafragou and
Musolino, 2003 for acquisition, Huang and Snedeker, 2009 for processing). In particular,
Dieuleveut et al. (2017), using a task very similar to ours, found primary implicatures with
the quantifier some but not with numerals.4
4.2 Experiment 2
4.2.1 Goals
The main goals of our second experiment were (a) to understand why the results of our
first experiment differed so sharply from W&B’s results, and (b) to attempt once more, in
a different experimental setting, to detect ignorance inferences with comparatives, in order
to test their possible QUD-dependency. For this purpose, we adopted a design very close
to W&B’s. In particular, we switched to an inferential task, in which participants had to
evaluate how much a speaker knew given her answer to a question.
The characters involved in this experiment were police officers or investigators (who
asked questions) and witnesses (who responded to these questions). This brings us closer
to W&B’s judge/witness situation, while allowing more variety in the situations we con-
sidered. The conversation was also likely to be more casual than in a courtroom.
As discussed above, one other possible source of the discrepancies between the results
of our first experiment and those of W&B, is the fact that we considered positive modifiers
(at least and more than) while they considered negative ones (at most and less than). In
our second experiment, we tested both positive and negative modifiers.
Finally, as in our first experiment, we wanted to get a better understanding of the
potential contrast between propositions which match a complete answer to a given polar
question and propositions which are over-informative. In the previous experiment there
was a possible confound: we saw that the acceptability of more than was overall degraded
when it combined with a numeral which was not salient, even though it provided a complete
answer to the question, whereas the over-informative condition was overall well accepted,
4Something that might explain this difference is that Dieuleveut et al. (2017) used a binary response
option while we collected graded judgments.
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possibly because it involved the salient numeral six. In our second experiment, we varied
the polar question in such a way that more than n was sometimes but not always over-
informative, while keeping n salient. How this was achieved is explained in more detail
below.
4.2.2 Manipulating relevance through context
We manipulated the relevance of the response provided by a modified numeral to a polar
question by varying contexts instead of the numeral (as we did in Experiment 1). Schemat-
ically, if n is the numeral that was modified, “upward” contexts involved a polar question
equivalent in terms of resolution conditions to “is it at least n?”, while “downward” con-
texts involved a polar question equivalent to “is it at most n?”.5 However, we needed to
make sure that the questions would not explicitly contain a modified numeral. Upward
contexts typically established a requirement for n items, whereas downward contexts spec-
ified a maximum number of items. This way, we could simply ask whether the rules had
been respected, without having to mention any modified numeral in the question.
Let us illustrate this with some concrete examples. In an upward context, an investi-
gator may ask whether there were enough seat belts for the five passengers in a car. If the
witness answers that there were more than five seat belts, she gave an over-informative
positive answer. Fewer than five would be a negative relevant answer. Finally, at least five
would be a positive relevant answer, but at most five would not resolve the question (there
may have been five, and there may have been fewer than five).
The roles are reversed in a downward context, in which an investigator may for instance
ask whether the maximum load of ten people was exceeded during an elevator incident.
In this case, saying that more than ten people were present in the elevator is a positive
relevant answer, while fewer than ten is a negative over-informative answer. Finally, at
most ten is a negative relevant answer, while at least ten does not resolve the question.
To sum up, our manipulation allowed us to test comparatives both as relevant and as
over-informative answers, and the numeral being modified was always salient and round,
whether the resulting construction matched a complete answer or not. Superlatives always
corresponded to relevant answers (cases in which superlatives did not answer the question
were excluded from the experiment, since they would introduce an orthogonal issue).
4.2.3 Methodology
Participants: 95 participants were recruited on MTurk for the experiment. The partic-
ipants were self-reported adult English speakers (age: 20 – 63, mean: 35). They received
$1.80 for their participation in the experiment.
Materials and procedure: Every participant read the following instructions on the
first screen:
In this survey, you will see short dialogues between police officers and witnesses
in some legal cases. Each example will come with a few sentences giving the
context of this discussion. The witnesses are neither suspects nor plaintiffs,
so they have a neutral position in the cases. They have no reason to hide
5Concretely, the questions we used were phrased positively, so that positive quantifiers would always
be associated with the response particle ‘Yes’, while negative ones were associated with the particle ‘No’.
In this sense, they are closer to “is it more than n?” than “is it at most n?”.
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Figure 5: Example of a target item in Experiment 2 with an upward context, polar QUD,
and a relevant comparative construction (i.e. fewer than).
information from the investigators, and are therefore being as cooperative as
they can.
Each experimental item consisted of a context story, a question-answer pair, and a
prompt. An example is presented in Figure 5. We manipulated the following factors: QUD
(polar or how-many), Quantifier (superlative, comparative-relevant, comparative-over-
informative, and bare numeral), and ContextType (upward or downward). All factors
were within subject. All factors but ContextType were within item.
The QUD factor determined whether the investigator’s question was a polar or a how-
many question. Each context story came in two versions: one that mentioned an explicit
threshold, for the polar QUD, and one which did not specify any threshold, for the how-
many QUD. Responses to polar questions always involved the response particle (‘yes’
or ‘no’ depending on the case). The concrete quantifier used in the witness’s response
depended on both Quantifier and ContextType, as explained above: in upward con-
texts, the superlative modifier was at least, the relevant comparative was fewer than, and
the over-informative comparative was more than. In downward contexts, the superlative
modifier was at most and the roles of fewer than and more than were reversed. Note that
this contrast between over-informative and relevant answers only makes sense for polar
questions, but to keep the comparison minimal, we kept the same quantifiers in how-many
QUDs. The context fixed the numeral used in all conditions. It was always a round number,
ranging from 5 to 1000, and it was written in words.
In all target items, the prompt was a question of the form “Would you conclude that
the witness knows exactly how many . . . ?”. Participants responded using a 5-point Likert
scale from “Definitely not” to “Definitely yes”.
We designed 24 contexts (12 upward, 12 downward). The 8 possible combinations
of QUD and Quantifier were presented three times to each participant following a
latin-square design. This means that some participants would see some combinations of
quantifiers and QUD as upward twice and downward once, while other participants would
see the same combinations as downward twice and upward once. The order was fully
randomized across participants.
In addition to the 24 targets, each participant saw the same 10 fillers (5 true, 5 false).
Pre-processing and data analysis: Pre-processing was done in the same way as for
Experiment 1. We decided to ignore three fillers when computing error rates because they
tested participants’ attention in a convoluted way and were answered incorrectly in 90%
of cases on average. Eleven participants were removed because their error rate on the rest
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Figure 6: Individual responses to each target condition in Experiment 2. The relevance of
the answer provided by a comparative modified numeral to the polar question, marked by
the blue-green contrast here, depended on an interaction between context type (upward or
downward) and polarity (negative fewer than or positive more than).
of filler items was at least one standard deviation above the mean error rate (threshold:
31.8%). The mean error rate on remaining participants was 6.1%. The analyses followed
the methods of the first experiment, with the only difference that the used mixed-effects
models also had items random effects (in addition to subjects random effects).
4.2.4 Results
The results are presented in Figure 6. The higher the response, the less ignorance partici-
pants attributed to the witness.
For the statistical analysis, we defined a Polarity factor: at least and more than are
positive quantifiers, whereas at most and fewer than are negative quantifiers. We first ran
a model on responses to all target items with the following predictors: QuantifierType
(comparative vs. superlative), Polarity (centered, with negative at −0.5, and positive at
+0.5) and QUD (centered, with how-many at −0.5, polar at +0.5). The results, given in
Table 4, showed significant main effects of Polarity (positive quantifiers give rise to less
ignorance) and QUD (polar QUDs give rise to less ignorance). These two effects interacted
positively, suggesting that the effect of QUD was stronger for positive quantifiers. No other
effect was significant, in particular, none of the interactions associated with QuantifierType.
We fitted a second model focused on data from comparative modifiers and polar QUD
to test for effects of relevance. This model confirmed the results of the first model (clear
main effects of Polarity), but showed no effect of Relevance (t = −0.21, p = .83) and
no interaction (t = 1.5, p = .13: if anything more than gives rise to less ignorance when
providing an over-informative answer, which is the opposite of what one would expect).
We also fitted a model on the results involving bare numerals. This showed a marginal
effect of ContextType (t = 1.96, p = .05), but no significant effect of QUD or interaction
(both |t| < 1.1, p > .30).
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β t-value p-value
(Intercept) -0.59 -16.72 0.000???
QuantifierType[Superlative] 0.06 1.30 0.20
Polarity 0.24 3.84 0.000???
QUD 0.18 4.01 0.000???
QuantifierType[Superlative]:Polarity 0.12 1.41 0.16
QuantifierType[Superlative]:QUD 0.05 0.70 0.48
Polarity:QUD 0.24 2.69 0.007??
QuantifierType[Superlative]:Polarity:QUD -0.04 -0.29 0.77
Table 4: Estimates for the fixed effects of the model fitted on target conditions for Exper-
iment 2.
4.2.5 Discussion
We replicated Coppock and Brochhagen’s (2013a) finding that negative quantifiers give rise
to stronger ignorance inferences than positive ones. We did not observe any effect of rele-
vance on responses to polar QUDs. Recall that in Experiment 1, we observed that for more
than, PolarOverInf was judged differently than PolarRelevant. This, we conjec-
tured, could be due to the difference in relevance, or due to the fact that PolarOverInf
required mentioning a number that was salient in that context (more than six ), unlike Po-
larRelevant. The null effect of relevance in this experiment suggests that the contrast
observed in Experiment 1 was caused by the salience of six.
We also confirmed that ignorance inferences are QUD-sensitive, as we had observed
in Experiment 1. However, unlike in Experiment 1, we observed no difference between
superlative and comparative modified numerals regarding the strength of ignorance infer-
ences. This is in line with the results of W&B, and it raises an important question: what
could explain the difference between our first experiment on the one hand, and W&B and
our second experiment on the other hand? The third experiment addressed this issue.
4.3 Experiment 3
4.3.1 Goals
The main goal of this experiment was to gain a better understanding of the apparent con-
flict between the results of the first two experiments. We hypothesized that, among the
various factors we identified in Section 4.1.4, the difference in the task was the most likely
explanation. In Experiment 1, participants had to judge the acceptability of an utterance,
while they were informed about the knowledge state of the speaker. In Experiment 2, par-
ticipants had to decide whether or not to draw an ignorance inference, based on the context
and the given utterance. In order to directly assess the hypothesis that the difference in
task was responsible for the observed contrasts between the results of the two experiments,
we adapted the task of Experiment 2, making it very similar to the one of Experiment 1.
At the same time, the materials of Experiment 2 were preserved as much as possible. How
this was done is described in more detail below.
4.3.2 Methods
Participants: 96 participants were recruited on MTurk for the experiment. The partic-
ipants were self-reported adult English speakers (age: 20 – 67, mean: 35). They received
$1.50 for their participation in the experiment.
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Figure 7: Example of a target Approximate item in Experiment 3 with a downward context,
polar QUD, and more than.
‘at least n’ ‘more than n’ ‘at most n’ ‘fewer than n’
Precise : n+ δ n− δ
Approximate:
between n between n+ δ between n− 3δ between n− 3δ
and n+ 3δ and n+ 3δ and n and n− δ
Table 5: Description of the witness’s knowledge in each condition for each quantifier, where
n is the numeral used by the witness and δ is a lower level of granularity (e.g., n = 10 and
δ = 1, or n = 500 and δ = 25).
Materials and procedure: The experiment mainly differed from Experiment 2 in the
following two respects. First, we added information to each item on what the witness
actually knew. Second, we changed the prompt from “Would you conclude that the witness
knows. . . ” to “Is the witness’s answer appropriate?”. An example is given in Figure 7.
We added a two-level factor Knowledge determining how much the witness knew
about each situation. In the Precise condition, the witness knew exactly what the num-
ber of relevant items was. This would be in conflict with potential ignorance inferences
triggered by her answer. In the Approximate condition, the witness only knew a range
of possible values that was chosen to be maximally compatible with a potential ignorance
inference.6 The numbers were selected based on the algorithm shown in Table 5.
The addition of the Knowledge manipulation would have doubled the number of
items in comparison with Experiment 2. We dropped certain conditions to compensate
for this: since we did not observe any difference between relevant and over-informative
answers in Experiment 2, we kept only relevant answers this time. This means that in the
polar QUD cases, more than was not tested in upward contexts, and fewer than was not
tested in downward contexts.
The modifiers and the QUDs were balanced across contexts, although their combina-
tions were not: at least and fewer than appeared in the HowMany condition of downward
contexts, and at most and more than appeared in the HowMany condition of upward
contexts. This was because, as explained in the method section of the previous experiment
(Section 4.2.2), in case of polar QUDs not every context could appear with every modifier.
That is, only upward contexts could be combined with at least and fewer than and down-
ward contexts with at most and more than. Since how many questions do not pose such
a restriction, they were used to balance the design. This move was justified by a post-hoc
6In addition to being compatible with potential ignorance inferences, the range of possible values in the
Approximate condition respected the exhaustivity inference discussed in Cummins et al. (2012) as well.
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analysis of data from the previous experiment, showing that ContextType did not have
any interaction with QUD or Polarity (χ2(3) = .88, p = .83). Bare numerals appeared
with both QUDs in each context.
We used a latin-square design with 24 context stories (the same stories as in Experi-
ment 2). The experiment also included 2 training items (immediately after the instructions)
and 12 fillers (8 were false controls, where the witness’s knowledge directly contradicted her
statement; in the other 4 the witness had approximate knowledge and used the expression
about n in her response).
Pre-processing and data analysis: Pre-processing and analysis were done in the same
way as for Experiment 2. Ten participants were removed because their error rate on the
filler items was at least one standard deviation above the mean error rate (threshold:
30.8%). The mean error rate on remaining participants was 2.7%.
4.3.3 Results
The results are presented in Figure 8. We ran a model on responses to all target items
with Polarity, QUD, and QuantifierType encoded as in Experiment 2: Quanti-
fierType was treatment-coded (comparative vs. superlative), Polarity was centered
(with negative at −0.5, and positive at +0.5) and QUD was centered (with how-many at
−0.5, and polar at +0.5). Knowledge was treatment-coded with Approximate as the
baseline. The results, given in Table 6, showed a significant effect of QuantifierType
(superlative quantifiers are more acceptable in Approximate situations than comparatives
are), an effect of QUD (the acceptability of comparatives is higher with polar QUDs), a
strong interaction between Knowledge and QuantifierType (superlative quantifiers
are clearly degraded in Precise situations), and a triple interaction between Knowledge,
QuantifierType and Polarity (at most is more sensitive than at least to ignorance
violations). Most notably, Knowledge had no effect whatsoever on comparative quanti-
fiers, showing that these quantifiers do not convey ignorance in this experimental setup.
β t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.56 13.50 0.000???
QuantifierType[Superlative] 0.15 2.82 0.005??
Polarity -0.04 -0.42 0.674
Knowledge[Precise] 0.02 0.45 0.654
QUD 0.27 2.46 0.014?
QuantifierType[Superlative]:Polarity 0.14 1.31 0.191
QuantifierType[Superlative]:Knowledge[Precise] -0.59 -7.90 0.000???
Positive:Knowledge[Precise] 0.04 0.30 0.762
QuantifierType[Superlative]:QUD -0.14 -0.96 0.335
Polarity:QUD 0.18 1.27 0.203
Knowledge[Precise]:QUD -0.02 -0.15 0.877
QuantifierType[Superlative]:Polarity:Knowledge[Precise] 0.65 4.64 0.000???
QuantifierType[Superlative]:Polarity:QUD -0.03 -0.16 0.876
QuantifierType[Superlative]:Knowledge[Precise]:QUD 0.27 1.57 0.117
Polarity:Knowledge[Precise]:QUD -0.15 -0.80 0.426
QuantifierType[Superlative]:Polarity:Knowledge[Precise]:QUD -0.08 -0.30 0.765
Table 6: Estimates for the fixed effects of the model fitted on target conditions for Exper-
iment 3.
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Figure 8: Individual responses to each target condition in Experiment 3. Similar to Exper-
iment 1, ignorance inferences manifest themselves as differences between the Precise and
Approximate conditions.
Overall, these results are very close to what we found in Experiment 1: strong ignorance
effects with superlative modifiers, and none with comparative modifiers. Interestingly, the
three-way interaction between Knowledge, QuantifierType and QUD, which would
have indicated QUD sensitivity for the ignorance inferences of superlative modifiers, did not
reach significance (p = .11). While this might seem surprising at first sight, this finding also
matches the results of Experiment 1. There, we observed a three-way interaction, indicating
that the ignorance inferences of superlative modifiers are QUD-sensitive. However, this
three-way interaction was only present in the Exact Situation, while in the Exceed
Situation, it was of the same magnitude as in the current experiment and failed to reach
significance. Since the Precise Knowledge condition in this Experiment is closer to the
Exceed Situation in Experiment 1, this result is not surprising.
In line with Experiment 2, ignorance inferences affected the acceptability of the negative
modifier at most more than that of the positive modifier at least.
4.3.4 Discussion
Figure 9 presents a condensed summary of the most important results obtained in the
three experiments. The graphs highlight the main finding: in Experiments 1 and 3, the
acceptability of superlative modifiers was sensitive to ignorance effects, unlike that of com-
parative modifiers. In Experiment 2, we observed no difference between the two types of
modifiers. In all three experiments, we observed that whenever an effect of ignorance was
present, it was sensitive to the QUD. Furthermore, negative quantifiers systematically gave
rise to stronger ignorance inferences than their positive counterparts.
The results of Experiment 3 provide clear indications on how to reconcile the conflicting
results obtained in the previous two experiments. Diverging minimally from the setup in
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Experiment 2, we were able to retrieve results very similar to those of Experiment 1. We
thus conclude that the source of the contrast observed between the results of Experiments 1
and 2, respectively, indeed lies in the difference between the two tasks: (i) when participants
judge the appropriateness of an expression while having access to the speaker’s knowledge,
they only take superlative modifiers to signal ignorance; (ii) when they have to draw
inferences about the speaker’s knowledge given what the speaker said in a certain context,
they assume both superlative and comparative modifiers to signal ignorance, which is
modulated by QUDs.
Here is one way to interpret this finding. The two tasks make participants take different
perspectives in communication. In Experiment 1 and 3, they are more likely to take the
speaker’s perspective, as they have access to her internal mental state and judge the appro-
priateness of different utterances. This makes the task relatively close to actual production.
In Experiment 2 and W&B’s experiment, participants are more likely to take the hearer’s
perspective, as they have to draw inferences about the speaker’s state based on what was
said. Our results suggest that when taking the perspective of speakers in the task, partic-
ipants are sensitive to the comparative/superlative distinction with respect to ignorance
inferences, but this distinction does not play a role when they take the hearer’s perspective.
A possible interpretation is that participants are sensitive to different sets of maxims in the
two tasks, or that they weigh the maxims differently. We will propose in Section 5 that,
while the ignorance inference of more than arises through the maxim of quantity, that of
at least arises both through quantity and through the independent maxim of inquisitive
sincerity. Our findings can then be accounted for under the assumption that when taking
the speaker’s perspective, participants give more importance to inquisitive sincerity, while
when taking the hearer’s perspective, they give more importance to quantity.7
7Lauer (2014) argues that violations of quantity give rise to “Need a reason” implicatures, which often –
but not always – amount to inferring that the speaker is ignorant. That is, when hearing an utterance which
had a more informative alternative, we look for a reason why the speaker did not utter this alternative,
and the most salient candidate explanation is that doing so would have violated Quality (i.e., the speaker
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Figure 9: Mean and SE for a derived measure of Ignorance in each of the 3 experiments.
For Experiments 1 and 3, we computed the mean difference between conditions that re-
spected and violated ignorance. For Experiment 2, we computed 3 minus the mean answer.
0 corresponds to a no-ignorance baseline, although it is somewhat arbitrary in the case of
Experiment 2. Relevant and over-informative answers to polar questions were pooled to-
gether.
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Apart from their theoretical significance, our findings are also of interest from a method-
ological point of view: we showed that two different tasks tapped into different aspects of
the semantics and pragmatics of modified numerals. If we are right that the differences
are caused by the fact that participants weigh maxims differently when considering their
responses, this would have implications for the experimental investigation of implicatures
more broadly.
We also observed a systematic contrast between positive and negative quantifiers in
Experiments 2 and 3. A similar contrast had been observed in Coppock and Brochhagen
(2013a) but has not been explained, as far as we know. A tentative explanation would be
that this contrast results from world knowledge on how information is acquired. Concretely,
one can gather positive evidence that there are at least five children in a room by counting
the visible children and keep open the possibility that some of them may be hiding. By
contrast, it is much harder to construct a scenario in which one obtains direct evidence
that there are at most five children in a room. Since it is harder to collect direct evidence
supporting a downward entailing statement, participants may be tempted to attribute
stronger ignorance to speakers who utter such statements.
5 A dual-route approach
We now spell out an account that combines a number of insights from the quantity-based
and inquisitive sincerity-based approaches.8 We provide the necessary background notions
from inquisitive semantics in Section 5.1, spell out the semantic component of our account
in Section 5.2, and then turn to the pragmatic component in Section 5.3.
5.1 Background notions and notation
In inquisitive semantics the meaning of a sentence ϕ, denoted [[ϕ]], is a set of propositions
encoding both the information that is conveyed and the issue that is expressed by ϕ.
Specifically, ϕ is taken to convey the information that the actual world is contained in⋃
[[ϕ]], which is denoted as info(ϕ), and to express an issue which is resolved precisely by
those propositions that are in [[ϕ]]. It is assumed that if a proposition p resolves a certain
issue, then any stronger proposition q ⊂ p resolves that issue as well. Thus, [[ϕ]] is always
downward closed : if it contains a proposition p it also contains any q ⊂ p. Furthermore, it is
assumed that the inconsistent proposition, ∅, resolves any issue. Thus, [[ϕ]] always contains
∅ and is therefore always non-empty. Taken together, sentence meanings in inquisitive
semantics are thus defined as non-empty, downward closed sets of propositions.
In some cases the issue expressed by a sentence ϕ is trivial, in the sense that it is already
resolved by the information conveyed by ϕ itself. This occurs if info(ϕ) ∈ [[ϕ]]. A sentence
does not know this alternative to be true). Such an explanation results in an ignorance inference, but
alternative explanations would result in other types of inferences. For instance, Alexandropoulou et al.
2017 show that in the right context, participants may draw an inference that the speaker is uncooperative
rather than ignorant. In the context of our study, Experiment 2 made ignorance very salient, plausibly
leading participants to attribute most Quantity violations to ignorance. In Experiments 1 and 3, there
was less focus on ignorance and alternative explanations may have been more salient. As an example, they
may consider the effort associated with producing “two-hundred seventy-five” a good reason to favor “less
than three hundred”. This would amount to attributing a violation of Quantity to Manner rather than
Quality, thus leading to an inference that the speaker is trying to be concise (and not that she is ignorant).
8A preliminary version of the account was presented in Ciardelli, Coppock, and Roelofsen (2016).
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ϕ is called inquisitive just in case the issue it expresses is non-trivial, i.e., just in case
info(ϕ) 6∈ [[ϕ]].
Finally, the semantic alternatives associated with a sentence ϕ are those propositions
that contain precisely enough information to resolve the issue expressed by ϕ. Technically,
these are the maximal elements of [[ϕ]]:
(26) alt(ϕ) := {p ∈ [[ϕ]] | there is no q ∈ [[ϕ]] such that p ⊂ q}
Note that this characterization of alternatives entails that one alternative can never be
properly contained in another; otherwise it could not be a maximal element of [[ϕ]]. Also
note that if ϕ is non-inquisitive, it is always associated with a unique alternative, namely
info(ϕ). Vice versa, if ϕ generates multiple alternatives, then it cannot be the case that
info(ϕ) ∈ [[ϕ]], which means that ϕ must be inquisitive.9
5.2 Semantic assumptions
Following Coppock and Brochhagen (2013b), we assume that at least sentences generate
multiple alternatives. However, following a suggestion made by Schwarz (2016a) in his
critique of C&B, we analyse at least n as generating just two alternatives, [n] and [n+1, ...).
For instance:
(27) alt( Bill ate at least four apples ) = { [4], [5,...) }
Note that this brings the analysis more in line with Bu¨ring’s intuition that at least n is
semantically equivalent to a disjunction n or more.10
As for more than n, we follow C&B in assuming that it generates just one semantic
alternative:
(28) alt( Bill ate more than three apples ) = { [4,...) }
The meaning for at least n and more than n given here should, of course, be obtained from
a general analysis of the two modifiers, one that allows us to analyze them in combination
with arguments other than numerals as well. Building on Solt (2011) and Coppock (2016),
9We should note here that there are several perspectives one can take on the connection between
inquisitiveness, a semantic notion, and the communicative effects of sentences when uttered in discourse.
The perspective assumed here, in the spirit of Groenendijk (2009) and Coppock and Brochhagen (2013b),
is that even if a sentence is inquisitive, i.e., even if it semantically expresses a non-trivial issue, a speaker
who utters this sentence in discourse does not necessarily raise this issue. In particular, she does not
necessarily request a response that addresses the issue. Under this perspective, it is possible to assume that
a disjunctive declarative sentence like John ate two or three apples (with falling intonation) is inquisitive,
just like the corresponding interrogative Did John eat two apples, or three?. One could say that the former
is used to make an assertion and the latter to ask a question, and that in making an assertion, speakers
do not raise the issue that the uttered sentence expresses (perhaps their assertion still ‘evokes’ the issue,
but the effect is weaker than in the case of a question). Another perspective that one could take (see,
e.g., Ciardelli et al., 2015; Farkas and Roelofsen, 2017) is that the issue expressed by a sentence is always
raised when the sentence is uttered in discourse. Under this perspective, it does not make sense to treat
a disjunctive declarative as being inquisitive, on a par with the corresponding disjunctive question. This
perspective allows for a more economical interface between semantics and discourse pragmatics, but is not
directly compatible with the present proposal.
10Since we assume that the alternatives for at least n are never nested, the analysis we are proposing
here can be formulated in the basic inquisitive semantics framework. By contrast, the account of Coppock
and Brochhagen (2013b) had to be formulated in a version of inquisitive semantics that allows for nested
alternatives. As discussed in Ciardelli et al. (2016), this has a number of problematic repercussions.
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we assume that an expression of the form at least ϕ is interpreted relative to a context c
providing (i) a comparison class, which is a set of sentence meanings Φ (in the inquisitive
semantics sense) including the meaning of the prejacent [[ϕ]], and (ii) a pragmatic strength
ordering c, which is a partial order on Φ, possibly but not necessarily coinciding with
entailment. Relative to such a context c, at least ϕ is interpreted as follows:
(29) [[at least ϕ ]] = exhc[[ϕ]] ∪ strongerc[[ϕ]]
where:
• exhc[[ϕ]] = {p ∈ [[ϕ]] | there is no non-empty q ∈ [[ϕ]] such that Φq ⊂ Φp}
• Φp = {P ∈ Φ | p is compatible with P} (and similarly for Φq)
• p is compatible with P ⇐⇒ p ∩ info(P ) 6= ∅
• strongerc[[ϕ]] =
⋃{P ∈ Φ | P c [[ϕ]]}
In words, [[at least ϕ ]] is obtained by taking the union of two sets of propositions. The
first set is the exhaustive strengthening of [[ϕ]] relative to c, exhc[[ϕ]]. We assume that
exhaustification amounts to minimization of compatibility with other elements in the given
comparison class. Thus, exhc[[ϕ]] is the set of propositions p in [[ϕ]] that are compatible
with a minimal set of elements in Φ. In other words, it is impossible to find a consistent
proposition q ∈ [[ϕ]] that is compatible with a strict subset of the elements of Φ that p is
compatible with.
For instance, if Φ = {[[Bill ate n apples]] | n ∈ N}, assuming a one-sided semantics
of bare numerals, and if the pragmatic strength ordering corresponds to entailment, then
exhc[[Bill ate four apples]] is the set of propositions p such that (i) p ∈ [[Bill ate four apples]],
i.e., every world in p is one in which Bill ate four or more apples, and (ii) p is not compatible
with info(Bill ate n apples) for any n > 4. Thus, as expected, exhc[[Bill ate four apples]]
amounts to [[Bill ate only four apples]].
The second set of propositions, which we denote as strongerc[[ϕ]], is simply obtained by
taking the union of all the elements of the contextual comparison class Φ that are prag-
matically stronger than [[ϕ]]. Thus, in the above example, strongerc[[Bill ate four apples]] =⋃{[[Bill ate n apples | n > 4} which, under the one-sided semantic interpretation of nu-
merals assumed here, amounts to [[Bill ate five apples]]. Thus, as desired, we derive that
[[Bill ate at least four apples]] = [[Bill ate only four apples]] ∪ [[Bill ate five apples]].11
11For ease of exposition, we have assumed above that the prejacent of at least is a sentential expression.
However, in most cases the prejacent of at least is most naturally taken to be a quantifier. For instance,
the structure of “at least Alice and Bob came” is naturally taken to be [at least Alice and Bob][came], and
not [at least ][Alice and Bob came]. Fortunately, it is not hard to adapt the treatment described above
to fit this more realistic assumption. In inquisitive semantics, the semantic value of a sentence is a set
of propositions, i.e., an object of type 〈st, t〉, abbreviated as T . A property is an object of type eT , i.e.,
a function mapping individuals to sets of propositions. Finally, a quantifier is an object of type 〈eT, T 〉,
i.e., a function mapping properties to sets of propositions. We can then analyze at least as a modifier of
quantifiers, i.e., as denoting a function from quantifiers to quantifiers. Assuming that for any quantifier Q,
the context of use supplies a comparison class Φc consisting of multiple quantifiers including Q itself, as
well as a pragmatic strength ordering c over Φc, the entry for at least can be formulated as follows:
(i) [[at least ]] = λQ〈eT,T 〉.λAeT .exhc(Q,A) ∪ strongerc(Q,A)
where:
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We assume that sentences of the form more than ϕ are also interpreted relative to a
contextually given, partially ordered comparison class. Only in this case, the meaning of
the sentence simply amounts to strongerc[[ϕ]].
(30) [[more than ϕ ]] = strongerc[[ϕ]]
To briefly illustrate how the general treatment of at least fares outside the domain of
modified numerals, consider the following example:
(31) At least Ann left.
Suppose that the contextually given comparison class is as in (32), and that the strength
ordering amounts to entailment:12
(32) Φc =

[[Ann left]] [[Bill left]] [[Chris left]]
[[Ann and Bill left]] [[Bill and Chris left]] [[Chris and Ann left]]
[[Ann and Bill and Chris left]]

Then we get that:
(33) a. exhc[[(31)]] = [[Only Ann left]]
b. strongerc[[(31)]] =
⋃
[[Ann and Bill left]],
[[Ann and Chris left]],
[[Ann and Bill and Chris left]]

This means that:13
(34) alt((31)) =

{w | Only Ann left in w},
{w | Ann and Bill left in w},
{w | Ann and Chris left in w}

5.3 Pragmatic assumptions
5.3.1 Inquisitive sincerity
Following Coppock and Brochhagen (2013b) and earlier work on inquisitive pragmatics
(Groenendijk and Roelofsen, 2009), we assume a maxim of inquisitive sincerity: if a speaker
utters an inquisitive sentence ϕ, the issue that the sentence expresses should not already
be resolved in the speaker’s information state.14 By this maxim, an utterance of an in-
(ii) a. strongerc(Q,A) =
⋃{Q′(A) | Q′ c Q}
b. exhc(Q,A) = {p ∈ Q(A) | there is no non-empty q ∈ Q(A) such that ΦAq ⊂ ΦAp }
c. ΦAp = {Q′(A) | Q′ ∈ Φc and p is compatible with Q′(A)}
12Something that we have not made explicit here, since it is orthogonal to our concerns and would lead
us quite far astray, is that the comparison class Φ should be constrained by the focus structure of ϕ.
Coppock and Brochhagen (2013b) capture this by letting the stronger alternatives come from the QUD.
We are not taking the alternatives directly from the QUD here, so the link will have to be made indirectly.
13Note that {w | Ann and Bill and Chris left in w} is also an element of [[(31)]], but it is not a maximal
element, so it is not one of the semantic alternatives associated with the sentence.
14The original formulation of the inquisitive sincerity maxim in Groenendijk and Roelofsen (2009) makes
reference to the common ground: “If a speaker utters a sentence ϕ that is inquisitive w.r.t. the common
ground, then ϕ should be inquisitive w.r.t. the speaker’s information state as well.” For our current
purposes this qualification is not necessary. Note also that Coppock and Brochhagen operate with a
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quisitive sentence ϕ implicates that the speaker’s information state is located in the set
inq-sincerity(ϕ), defined as follows:
(35) inq-sincerity(ϕ) := {s | if ϕ is inquisitive, then s 6∈ [[ϕ]]}
5.3.2 Quality (informative sincerity)
As usual, we assume the Gricean maxim of Quality: if a speaker utters a sentence ϕ,
her information state s should support the informative content of ϕ: s ⊆ info(ϕ).By this
maxim, an utterance of ϕ implicates that the speaker’s information state is located in the
set quality(ϕ) which is defined as follows:
(36) quality(ϕ) := {s | s ⊆ info(ϕ)}
Note that Quality requires speakers to be sincere, on a par with the maxim of inquisitive
sincerity. Only, while inquisitive sincerity pertains to the issue expressed by the sentence
that is uttered, Quality pertains to its informative content. Groenendijk and Roelofsen
(2009) emphasise this similarity by referring to Quality as the maxim of informative sin-
cerity. We will also sometimes use this terminology below. However, it is important for
our purposes to stress that, while the maxims of inquisitive and informative sincerity are
similar in nature, they are two independent maxims. In particular, in certain contexts
speakers may be expected to comply with one of them but not necessarily with the other.
The importance of this independence will become clear below.
5.3.3 Quantity
Following Schwarz (2016b) and many others, we assume that the maxim of quantity is
concerned with alternative expressions that the speaker could have used. However, only
expressions that are relevant to the question under discussion should be taken into consid-
eration. Thus, unlike Schwarz, we distinguish lexical formal alternatives from contextual
formal alternatives. The set of lexical formal alternatives for a sentence ϕ is denoted as Aϕ.
Following Schwarz, we assume that the lexical formal alternatives for at least n are {at least
m | m ∈ N} and {only m | m ∈ N}, and similarly, the lexical formal alternatives for more
than n are {more than m | m ∈ N} and {only m | m ∈ N}:
(37) Lexically determined formal alternatives
a. at least n: {at least m | m ∈ N} ∪ {only m | m ∈ N}
b. more than n: {more than m | m ∈ N} ∪ {only m | m ∈ N}
The set of contextual formal alternatives for a sentence ϕ relative to a question under
discussion Q, denoted Aϕ,Q, contains all and only those lexical formal alternatives for ϕ
that are wholly relevant to Q:
(38) Aϕ,Q := {ψ ∈ Aϕ | ψ is wholly relevant to Q}
What does it mean for ψ to be wholly relevant to Q? Recall that the semantic alternatives
in alt(Q) are propositions that contain precisely enough information to resolve the issue
stronger sincerity maxim, which they call the maxim of interactive sincerity. On their account this is
needed because the predictions that inquisitive sincerity delivers are too weak. On the present account,
inquisitive sincerity delivers the right predictions, and interactive sincerity would do so as well; indeed, in
the basic inquisitive semantics framework, interactive sincerity and inquisitive sincerity are equivalent.
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expressed by Q. They can be thought of, then, as wholly relevant, complete resolutions
of Q, i.e., complete resolutions that do not include any potentially irrelevant information.
Similarly, any union of two or more such alternatives can be thought of as a wholly relevant,
partial resolution of Q. Thus, we say that ψ is wholly relevant to Q if and only if info(ψ)
coincides with the union of a set of semantic alternatives in alt(Q).
(39) ψ is wholly relevant to Q iff info(ψ) =
⋃
Q′ for some Q′ ⊆ alt(Q).
We now turn to specifying exactly how quantity implicatures are derived. To facilitate
direct comparison with Schwarz’s account, we will stay as close as possible to his innocent
exclusion-based recipe. The only difference is that we restrict attention to contextual
formal alternatives rather than always taking all lexical formal alternatives into account.
First, we compute primary quantity implicatures: if a speaker utters a sentence ϕ,
then her information state must not support the informative content of any contextual
pragmatic alternative that would have been more informative than ϕ. Let A⊂ϕ,Q denote the
set of contextual formal alternatives that would have been more informative than ϕ:
(40) A⊂ϕ,Q = {ψ ∈ Aϕ,Q | info(ψ) ⊂ info(ϕ)}
Then, an utterance of ϕ in the context of a question Q implicates that the speaker’s
information state is included in the set quantity1(ϕ,Q) which is defined as follows:
(41) quantity1(ϕ,Q) = {s | for all ψ ∈ A⊂ϕ,Q : s 6∈ quality(ψ)}
Next, we compute secondary quantity implicatures. The recipe for doing so is the
same as on Schwarz’s proposal, except that we now take Q into consideration. That is,
we identify all formal alternatives ψ in A⊂ϕ,Q that are innocently excludable w.r.t. ϕ and Q.
This holds just in case for every subset A′ of A⊂ϕ,Q, if it is possible to find an information
state in quality(ϕ)∩quantity1(ϕ,Q) that rejects every sentence in A′, then it is also possible
to find a state in quality(ϕ)∩quantity1(ϕ,Q) that rejects every sentence in A′ as well as ψ.15
Secondary quantity implicatures are based on the assumption that the speaker’s state
rejects all innocently excludable alternatives. Thus, we assume that an utterance of ϕ
implicates that the speaker’s state is located in the set quantity2(ϕ,Q), defined as follows:
(42) quantity2(ϕ,Q) = {s | s rejects any ψ ∈ A⊂ϕ,Q innocently excludable w.r.t. ϕ and Q}
If inquisitive sincerity, informative sincerity / quality, and quantity implicatures are all
taken into account, what a hearer will conclude is that the speaker’s information state
must be in the set cooperative(ϕ,Q) defined as follows:
(43) cooperative(ϕ,Q) = inq-sincerity(ϕ)∩ quality(ϕ)∩ quantity1(ϕ,Q)∩ quantity2(ϕ,Q)
5.3.4 Variance in robustness and strength of implicatures
We assume that, depending on the specific context at hand, speakers may be expected to
comply more strictly with certain maxims than with others.16 This means that hearers,
15In determining which formal alternatives are innocently excludable, one may also restrict oneself to
the class of information states sincerity(ϕ) ∩ quantity1(ϕ,Q) rather than the broader class quality(ϕ) ∩
quantity1(ϕ,Q). This would not affect the predictions of our account, at least not in the empirical domain
we are considering here.
16Though this assumption is sometimes left implicit, we take it to be commonplace. For instance, Grice
(1975, p.27) writes: “It is obvious that the observance of some of these maxims is a matter of less urgency
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when assessing a particular utterance in a given context, may sometimes give little weight
to certain classes of implicatures—in some settings they may, for instance, take informative
sincerity and quantity implicatures into account, but not inquisitive sincerity implicatures.
We therefore expect that implicatures which arise through two independent maxims
will be more robust than implicatures that arise through only one of these two maxims.
For, even if one of the two maxims is disregarded in a certain context, these implicatures
will still arise through the other maxim.
We also expect that the effects of implicatures that arise through two independent
maxims, when measured across a population of language users and across different conver-
sational settings, will be stronger than those of implicatures that arise through only one
of the maxims. To see this, let M1 and M2 be two independent maxims. Then, for any
language user u and any conversational setting s, the chance that x takes either M1 or
M2 (or both) to be active in s will be higher than the chance that she will take M1 to be
active in s, and also higher than the chance that she will take M2 to be active in s. Thus,
the cumulated effects of implicatures that arise through both M1 and M2 will be stronger
then those of implicatures that arise only through M1, or only through M2.
Given these considerations, our pragmatic theory does not only make predictions as to
whether or not a certain kind of implicature arises in a certain context, but also predictions
concerning the comparative robustness and strength of different kinds of implicatures.
These predictions are summarised in the following linking hypothesis.
(44) Linking hypothesis
Implicatures which arise through two independent maxims are more robust than
implicatures that arise through only one of these maxims, and their effects, when
measured across different language users and conversational settings, will be stronger.
As we will see in the next section, this hypothesis is crucial in explaining our experimental
findings. In particular, it will account for the robustness and strength of the ignorance
implicatures of at least in responses to a how many question, since on our account these
implicatures arise through two independent maxims—inquisitive sincerity and quantity.
6 Predictions
We now show that our account derives the following results. When at least is used in the
context of a how many question, an ignorance implicature is derived through both inquis-
itive sincerity and quantity. In the context of a polar question, it is derived through in-
quisitive sincerity only. For more than in how many contexts, ignorance is derived through
quantity only. For more than in polar question contexts, ignorance is not derived through
either route. These predictions are in line with the distinctions in robustness and strength
of ignorance implicatures found in our experiments.
6.1 Predictions in the context of a how many question
Suppose the question under discussion is the how many question in (45a), which we asso-
ciate with the set of semantic alternatives in (45b).
than is the observance of others; a man who has expressed himself with undue prolixity would, in general,
be open to milder comment than would a man who has said something he believes to be false”.
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QUD 0 1 2 3 4 5
at least 3 0 1 2 3 4 5
at least 4 0 1 2 3 4 5
only 3 0 1 2 3 4 5
only 4 0 1 2 3 4 5
only 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
Figure 10: At least 3 in a how many context. Contextual alternatives are depicted below
the horizontal line.
(45) a. Q: How many apples did John eat?
b. alt(Q) = {[0], [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], . . .}
Superlative modifiers: First, let us consider the sentence in (46a), involving the su-
perlative modifier at least. The semantic alternatives associated with this sentence on our
account are given in (46b).
(46) a. ϕ : John ate at least three apples.
b. alt(ϕ) = {[3], [4, . . . )}
Informative sincerity (quality) requires that s ⊆ info(ϕ), that is, s ⊆ [3, . . . ). On the other
hand, since ϕ is inquisitive, inquisitive sincerity requires that s 6∈ [[ϕ]]; that is, it requires s
not to be included in either of the semantic alternatives for ϕ; in other words, the speaker
should not believe that the number of apples was exactly three, nor should she believe that
the number is larger than three. So, from inquisitive sincerity we already derive that the
speaker should be ignorant about the number of apples that John ate.
(47) inq-sincerity(ϕ) = {s | s 6⊆ [3] and s 6⊆ [4, ...)}
Next, consider quantity implicatures. We have assumed that the lexical formal alternatives
for ϕ are sentences of the form ψn = John ate at least n apples or of the form χn =
John ate only n apples , for n ∈ N. All of these sentences are relevant for the question Q,
and therefore they qualify as contextual pragmatic alternatives. Thus, A⊂ϕ,Q consists of the
sentences ψn with n > 3, as well as χn with n ≥ 3. This is depicted in Figure 10.
Primary quantity implicatures require that the speaker could not have uttered any
of these sentences without violating informative sincerity. This means that s 6⊆ [3] and
s 6⊆ [4, ...). That is, the speaker should consider it possible that John ate exactly three
apples, and she should also consider it possible that John ate more than three apples. Thus,
precisely the same ignorance implicature that was derived through inquisitive sincerity is
also derived as a primary quantity implicature.
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(48) quantity1(ϕ) = inq-sincerity(ϕ)
Finally, we will show that no contextual formal alternative in A⊂ϕ,Q is innocently excludable,
which means that no secondary quantity implicatures arise. Consider for instance the for-
mal alternative ψ5, John ate at least 5 apples. To see that this alternative is not innocently
excludable, consider the set A′ = {χ4}, where χ4 = John ate only 4 apples . Rejecting
χ4 is consistent with the quality and primary quantity implicatures, since some informa-
tion states in quality(ϕ) ∩ quantity1(ϕ,Q) reject it (as a witness, take the state [3] ∪ [5]).
But rejecting χ4 as well as our candidate alternative ψ5 (John ate at least 5 apples) is not
consistent with the quality and primary quantity implicatures; no information state in
quality(ϕ) ∩ quantity1(ϕ,Q) rejects both χ4 and ψ5. In other words, rejecting ψ5 forces
acceptance of χ4, which means that the former is not innocently excludable. Similar rea-
soning holds for all the other at least alternatives ψn with n > 3. To see this, consider
the set A′n = {χ4, . . . , χn−1} (in particular, take A′4 = ∅). Some information states in
quality(ϕ) ∩ quantity1(ϕ,Q) reject all elements of A′n: if n = 4, this holds trivially, as
A′4 = ∅; if n > 4, we can take as a witness the state [3] ∪ [n]. However, no information
state in quality(ϕ) ∩ quantity1(ϕ,Q) rejects all elements of A′n in addition to ψn.
Similarly, to show that each ‘only alternative’ χn is not innocently excludable we can
take A′n = ∅ if n = 3, and A′n = {χm |m ≥ 4,m 6= n} if n > 3.
Since none of the alternatives is innocently excludable, no secondary quantity implica-
tures arise, or more precisely, nothing new is concluded about the state of the speaker by
drawing secondary quantity implicatures.
In sum, we have that:
(49) cooperative(ϕ,Q) = {s | s ⊆ [3, ...) and s 6⊆ [3] and s 6⊆ [4, ...)}
Thus, we predict that, from an utterance of (46a) in the context of the how many question
in (45a), an ignorance implicature is drawn, and no upper bounding implicature. Im-
portantly, the relevant ignorance implicature is not just that the speaker does not know
exactly how many apples John ate, but also that the speaker does not know whether John
ate exactly three apples or more. And since this implicature is derived both through in-
quisitive sincerity and through quantity, it is predicted to be more robust than ignorance
implicatures that arise through only one of these maxims.17
Comparative modifiers: Now consider (50a). We have assumed that this sentence is
associated with a unique semantic alternative, given in (50b).
(50) a. ϕ : John ate more than two apples.
b. alt(ϕ) = {[3, . . . )}
Let us compute what implicatures are predicted for ϕ in the context ofQ. First, informative
sincerity requires that s ⊆ info(ϕ). That is, the speaker should believe that John ate at
least three apples.
Since ϕ is not inquisitive, the maxim of inquisitive sincerity does not place any ad-
ditional constraints on the speaker’s state. In particular, no ignorance implicature arises
17Although modified numerals of the form ‘n or more’ are not within the immediate scope of the present
paper, it is worth mentioning that, given an inquisitive treatment of disjunction and assuming that the
first disjunct (i.e., n) is exhaustified to obviate redundancy (Chierchia et al., 2012; Katzir and Singh, 2013;
Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2017), our account makes exactly the same predictions for ‘n or more’ as for ‘at
least n’, which seems a desirable result.
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QUD 0 1 2 3 4 5
more than 2 0 1 2 3 4 5
more than 3 0 1 2 3 4 5
only 3 0 1 2 3 4 5
only 4 0 1 2 3 4 5
only 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
Figure 11: More than 2 in a how many context. Contextual alternatives are depicted
below the horizontal line.
through inquisitive sincerity in this case.
Now let us turn to quantity implicatures. The set of lexical formal alternatives for ϕ
consists of all sentences of the form ψn = John ate more than n apples and all sentences
χn = John ate only n apples, for any natural number n. The situation is depicted in
Figure 11. All of these formal alternatives are relevant to the question Q we are considering,
and therefore qualify as contextual pragmatic alternatives. Thus, we get the following
primary quantity implicatures:
(51) quantity1(ϕ,Q) = {s | s 6⊆ [3] and s 6⊆ [4, . . . )}
This means that we derive ignorance as a primary quantity implicature: the speaker should
not know whether John ate exactly three apples or more.
Finally, consider secondary quantity implicatures. Note that none of the formal alter-
natives ψ ∈ A⊂ϕ,Q is innocently excludable, for reasons parallel to those given for at least
above. This means that secondary quantity implicatures do not arise, which leads to the
following overall result:
(52) cooperative(ϕ,Q) = {s | s ⊆ [3, ...) and s 6⊆ [3] and s 6⊆ [4, ...)}
Thus, for the more than sentence (50a) in the context of the how many question in (45a)
we predict an ignorance implicature and no upper bounding implicature. While the rele-
vant ignorance inference is exactly the same that was derived above for (46a), there is a
crucial difference between the two cases: in the case of (50a) the inference is only derived
as a quantity implicature, while in the case of (46a) it was derived both through quantity
and through inquisitive sincerity. Given the Linking Hypothesis in (44), this provides an
account for the experimental results pertaining to how many contexts reported in Sec-
tion 4: we found that in the case of at least, ignorance implicatures arise very robustly,
across different experimental settings, while in the case of more than they arise in some
experimental settings, but not in all. We propose that those settings in which more than
does not give rise to ignorance implicatures (i.e., those in which participants had to judge
the appropriateness of a given utterance while having access to the speaker’s information
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state) are ones in which quantity implicatures are not given much weight, while sincerity
implicatures, both informative and inquisitive ones, are taken into full consideration.
6.2 Predictions in the context of a polar question
We now turn to polar question contexts. What is special about such contexts in our view
is that the formal alternatives that are lexically associated with a given expression, are
often not relevant w.r.t. the question under discussion, and therefore do not play a role in
the computation of quantity implicatures.
Suppose that John’s diet prescribes that he eat at most two apples per day, and does
not prescribe anything else. Consider the polar question in (53a). Given our contextual
assumptions, the semantic alternatives associated with this question are the ones given
in (53b).
(53) a. Did John stick to his diet today?
b. Q = {[0, 2], [3, . . . )}
Superlative modifiers: First, let us consider the response to Q in (54a) below, involving
the superlative modifier at least. The semantic alternatives associated with this sentence
on our account are given in (54b).
(54) a. ϕ : No, John ate at least three apples.
b. alt(ϕ) = {[3], [4, . . . )}
We have seen above that for this sentence, ignorance is derived as an inquisitive sincerity
implicature; since such implicatures are QUD-independent on our account, this inference
still goes through in the present setting.
As for quantity implicatures, note that none of the lexically determined formal alter-
natives for ϕ is relevant w.r.t. Q. Thus, the situation is as depicted in Figure 12. This
means that quantity implicatures do not arise, and we get the following overall result:
(55) cooperative(ϕ,Q) = {s | s ⊆ [3, ...) and s 6⊆ [3] and s 6⊆ [4, ...)}
Thus, an ignorance inference is derived in this case as well, but only through inquisitive
sincerity—not through quantity, unlike in the case of at least sentences in the context of
a how many question. Given our Linking Hypothesis in (44), this provides an explanation
of the finding that, the effects of ignorance inferences triggered by at least are, when
considered across different experimental settings, stronger in the context of a how many
question than in the context of a polar question. Recall that this contrast was found in
Experiments 1 and 2, and a similar tendency was observed (though not found significant)
in Experiment 3.
Also recall that the results of Experiment 2 were in fact compatible with the assumption
that, in this specific experimental setting, at least sentences did not give rise to ignorance
inferences at all in response to polar questions. If this is indeed the case, then it could be
accounted for by assuming that in performing the task that participants were given in this
experiment (i.e., judging whether or not the speaker had full knowledge about the number
of relevant items based on what she said), they did not give much weight to the maxim of
inquisitive sincerity.
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QUD 0 1 2 3 4 5
at least 3 0 1 2 3 4 5
[ no contextual alternatives ]
Figure 12: At least 3 in a polar context.
QUD 0 1 2 3 4 5
more than 2 0 1 2 3 4 5
[ no contextual alternatives ]
Figure 13: More than 2 in a polar context.
Comparative modifiers: Now consider (56a). This sentence is associated with a unique
semantic alternative, given in (56b).
(56) a. ϕ : No, John ate more than two apples.
b. alt(ϕ) = {[3, . . . )}
Again, none of the lexically determined formal alternatives for ϕ are relevant w.r.t. the given
polar QUD. Thus, the situation is as depicted in Figure 13. This means that no quantity
implicatures arise. In particular, no ignorance inference is derived, unlike in the context of
a how many question. This accounts for the fact that in none of our experiments, ignorance
implicatures were detected for more than sentences in response to polar questions.18
6.3 Further prediction: Mendia’s generalization
Before concluding, we would like to highlight one further prediction of the account, con-
cerning an empirical generalization recently put forward by Mendia (2016).
To track the reasoning that led to this generalization, first consider sentence (57) below.
We have seen that such sentences typically implicate that the speaker is uncertain as to
whether exactly two students completed the quiz or more.
(57) At least two students completed the quiz.
However, Mendia (2016) argues that this inference depends crucially on the fact that,
for numerals, the relevant comparison class is linearly ordered. In cases which involve a
partially ordered comparison class, such as (58), the speaker might in fact know that Ann
and Bill are not the only students who completed the quiz.
(58) At least Ann and Bill completed the quiz.
18In addition, notice that, due to the absence of contextually relevant formal alternatives, we also
correctly predict the lack of upper bounding implicatures for both (54a) and (56a).
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abcd
ab
abd abc
Figure 14: [[At least Ann and Bill left]]
To further support this claim, Mendia provides data showing that the answer in (59b) is
regarded considerably more acceptable than the one in (60b).
(59) a. Who completed the quiz?
b. I don’t remember, at least Ann and Bill, but not only them.
(60) a. How many students completed the quiz?
b. #I don’t remember, at least two, but not only two.
This leads Mendia to propose the following generalization:
(61) a. When the relevant comparison class forms a partial order, an at least sentence
need not convey speaker ignorance as to whether the exhaustified prejacent
holds;
b. When the relevant comparison class is a total order, an at least sentence does
always convey speaker ignorance with respect to the exhaustified prejacent.
This generalization is predicted by our account. For the at least Ann and Bill part of (59b)
we get the semantic value in Figure 14 (where a and b stand for Ann and Bill, respectively,
and c and d for two additional people in the domain of discourse). Under the pragmatic
assumptions we have laid out, the sentence can be felicitously uttered by a speaker as long
as her information state is consistent with multiple semantic alternatives. This requirement
can be satisfied even if the speaker’s information state excludes the exhaustified prejacent
alternative, {ab}, because there are multiple additional alternatives, due to the fact that
the comparison class does not form a total linear order in this case.
On the other hand, the first conjunct in (60b) only generates two semantic alternatives,
namely ‘exactly two’ and ‘more than two’, because the comparison class does form a
total linear order here. Therefore, ignorance with respect to both of these alternatives is
predicted.
7 Conclusion
We set out to address two related questions in this paper: (i) At the empirical level,
when exactly do superlative and comparative modified numerals give rise to ignorance
implicatures? And (ii) at a theoretical level, what are the sources of such implicatures?
In the literature, there is disagreement with respect to both questions. Empirically, the
received view is that superlative modifiers like at least trigger ignorance implicatures, while
comparative modifiers like more than don’t (e.g., Geurts and Nouwen, 2007). Recently,
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however, a number of different views have been put forward (Coppock and Brochhagen,
2013b; Mayr and Meyer, 2014; Westera and Brasoveanu, 2014). Theoretically, the main di-
vide is between approaches that derive ignorance inferences of modified numerals from the
maxim of quantity (e.g., Schwarz, 2016b; Mayr and Meyer, 2014; Westera and Brasoveanu,
2014) and an alternative approach which derives such inferences from the maxim of inquis-
itive sincerity (Coppock and Brochhagen, 2013b).
The experiments reported in the present paper show that the empirical picture is more
complex than has been assumed previously:
1. The ignorance implicatures of at least in how many contexts are strong and robust:
they were observed across all experimental settings.
2. The ignorance implicatures of (a) at least in polar contexts and (b) more than in how
many contexts are less robust: they were not detected in all experimental settings.
Moreover, the experimental settings in which the former were detected were not the
same as those in which the latter were detected. Finally, ignorance inferences are
usually weaker in these cases (and certainly never stronger) than those of at least in
how many contexts.
3. We did not detect any ignorance implicatures triggered by more than in polar con-
texts.
We proposed to account for these findings by merging the main ideas from the quantity-
based approaches and the inquisitive sincerity-based approach. In the resulting theory,
ignorance inferences may arise both through quantity and through inquisitive sincerity,
depending on the construction and the context at hand. Moreover, depending on the task
that participants are asked to perform in a specific experimental setting, the maxim of
quantity and the maxim of inquisitive sincerity may be given more or less importance.
In particular, when performing a task in which the speaker’s perspective is taken, i.e.,
when judging the appropriateness of a given utterance given a specification of the speaker’s
knowledge state, we propose that the maxim of quantity is given relatively little importance,
while when performing a task in which the hearer’s perspective is taken, i.e., when inferring
what the speaker’s knowledge state is based on what she said in a given context, the maxim
of inquisitive sincerity does not play a major role. We have argued that this dual-route
approach to ignorance implicatures is in a better position to account for our experimental
findings than any of the single-route approaches developed previously.
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